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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Equity-Specific Performance of Chattel Contracts
Historically, courts of equity refused to grant specific performance
of contracts for the sale of personal property on the theory that money
damages would enable the plaintiff to purchase other property of like
kind and quality.' This approach did not arise from any difference be-
tween personal and real property, but from the theory that equity will
not interfere where there is an adequate remedy at law for damages.2
But, upon a showing that the particular chattel had some special value
to the owner over and above any pecuniary estimate, such as a pretium
affectionis,3 that the chattel was unique, rare, and incapable of being
reproduced by damages, 4 or that it was not readily purchasable in the
market,5 these courts granted specific performance on the ground that
the remedy at law was inadequate.
6
Certainly, this inflexible approach was the most characteristic feature
of the early equity courts in this area, and many think it still exists
today.7 The attitude of the Virginia court8 in a recent case, however,
stands in sharp contrast to this view. That court in granting specific
performance stated:'
"Indeed, the modern disposition is to be less technical in the
application of this principle, and where a special need on the part
of the plaintiff, and at least a temporary monopoly on the part of
the defendant, justify its application, the remedy is allowed for
breach of contracts for the sale of personal property for which
damages might otherwise be adequate." 9
12 POMEROY, EQUITABLE REmEDIES § 748 (2nd ed. 1919).
'Heidner v. Hewitt Chevrolet Co., 166 Kan. 11, 13, 199 P. 2d 481, 483 (1948).
'Lewman & Co. v. Ogden Bros., 143 Ala. 351, 42 So. 102 (1904); Omaha
Lumber Co. v. Co-operative Inv. Co., 55 Colo. 271, 133 Pac. 1112 (1913) ; Steinway
& Sons v. Massey, 198 Ky. 265, 248 S. W. 884 (1923) ; Kacurek v. Matychowiak,
185 S. W. 740 (Mo. 1916) ; Chabert v. Robert & Co., Inc., 273 App. Div. 237, 76
N. Y. S. 2d 400 (1948); McMartin v. McMartin, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 449 (1946);
Titus v. Empire Mink Corp., 17 N. Y. S. 2d 909 (1939) ; Butler v. Wright, 186
N. Y. 259, 261-62, 78 N. E. 1002, 1003 (1906) ; Welch v. Chippewa Sales Co., 252
Wis. 766, 31 N. W. 2d 170 (1948). 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1402
(4th ed. 1919).
' Southern Iron & Equipment Co. v. Vaughan, 201 Ala. 356, 78 So. 212 (1918);
Koeling v. Bank of Sullivan, 220 S. W. 2d 794 (Mo. App. 1949) ; Spoor-Thompson
Mach. Co. v. Bennett Film Laboratories, 105 N. J. Eq. 108, 147 Atl. 202 (1929).
SEmirzian v. Asato, 23 Cal. App. 251, 137 Pac. 1072 (1913) aff'd 177 Cal. 493,
171 Pac. 90 (1918) ; Carolee v. Handelis, 103 Ga. 299, 29 S. E. 935 (1898) ; Coch-
rane v. Szpakowski, 355 Pa. 357, 49 A. 2d 692 (1946) ; Strause v. Berger, 220 Pa.
267, 270, 69 AtI. 818, 819 (1908); Shunney v. R. I. Hospital Trust Co., 80 R. I.
370, 96 A. 2d 828 (1953) ; Behnke v. Bede Shipping Co., 1927 1 K. B. 649.
4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1401 (4th ed. 1919).
SHeidner v. Hewitt Chevrolet Co., 166 Kan. 11, 199 P. 2d 481 (1948) ; Koelling
v. Bank of Sullivan, 220 S. W. 2d 794 (Mo. 1949) ; Chabert v. Robert & Co., 273
App. Div. 237, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 400 (1948) ; Cochrane v. Szpakowski, 355 Pa. 357,
49 A. 2d 692 (1946) ; Shunney v. R. I. Hospital Trust Co., 80 R. I. 370, 96 A. 2d
828 (1953) ; Welch v. Chippewa Sales Co., 252 Wis. 766, 31 N. W. 2d 170 (1948).
8 Thompson v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 197 Va. 208, 89 S. E. 2d 64 (1955).
1 Id. at -, 89 S. E. 2d at 67.
1956]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Against this background an examination of some of the cases to dis-
cover whether courts have maintained their early inflexible approach, or
have grown in flexibility so as to adjust the remedy of specific perform-
ance to the needs of the particular facts of each case seems worthwhile.
Machinery
Spoor-Thompson Machine Co. v. Bennett Film Laboratories,'0 a New
Jersey case, demonstrates that the view denying specific performance of
chattel contracts is yet very much alive. Plaintiff sought, under a con-
tract with the defendant, to compel the delivery of certain film-develop-
ing machines. A preliminary injunction to prevent sale to others was
denied; the court said that specific performance could not be granted
except in cases where damages at law would be inadequate, as in the
case of heirlooms and other articles 1 which are incapable of being re-
placed and are prized for their associations rather than their intrinsic
value. The fact, important in industry, that the machines could not be
secured from others except after a long period of time, and at consider-
able expense, was not regarded as justification for the action of a court
of equity.
Other cases, however, show that some courts have responded to the
needs of businesses. 12 In a recent Virginia case,'3 the state entered into
a contract with defendant for the construction and delivery of two spare
voting recorder units and two vote counters. The defendant failed to
deliver them, and the state instituted proceedings for specific perform-
ance of the contract, alleging that the machines could not be obtained
from anyone other than the defendant. The court awarded the relief
sought, saying that specific performance, while not the usual remedy,
will be granted where necessary to do complete justice between the
parties. Even though there was evidence that the machines could be
built by a first-class mechanic, the court said that the burden of securing
such construction should be on the defendant rather than on the plain-
tiff.14
An earlier case from Massachusetts' 5 was cited with approval by
the Virginia court.1 6 There, defendant refused to furnish the plaintiff
"0 105 N. J. Eq. 108, 147 Atl. 202 (1929).
11 This class includes articles of such great rarity and value as paintings, statues,
antiques, furniture, and jewelry. 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1402 (5th
ed. 1941).
1 Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 163 U. S.
564 (1896) ; Board of Comm rs of Mattamuskeet Drainage District v. A. V. Wills
& Sons, 236 Fed. 362 (E. D. N. C. 1916) ; Johnson v. Brooks, 93 N. Y. 337 (1883),
followed in Reo Stores v. Kent Stores, 118 N. Y. S. 2d 281 (1952).
"8 Thompson v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 197 Va. 208, 89 S. E. 2d 64 (1955).
2 Id. at -, 89 S. E. 2d at 68.
5 Adams v. Messenger, 147 Mass. 185, 17 N. E. 491 (1888).




with certain injectors for steam boilers, as agreed. The court granted
specific performance saying:
"Although the party aggrieved might have obtained damages
which would have been sufficient to have enabled him to pay for
constructing them, and although the work to be done necessarily
involved engineering skill as well as labor, he was not bound to
assume the responsibility of the labor of doing that which the
defendant agreed to do."'
17
To reflect the true attitude of these courts it is not enough to observe
that factors other than the peculiar nature of the chattel itself are con-
sidered in determining the appropriateness of specific performance as a
remedy. It should also be noted that in both cases in carrying out the
decree, possible supervision by the court of personal services involving
skill, labor, and judgment would be required. Further, in the Virginia
case,18 it seems significant that the court might have granted relief on the
theory that the product was unique and unavailable in the market.
Commodities
The realistic approach taken by the Virginia and Massachusetts
courts'9 is not confined to the area of machinery. For example, where
plaintiff sought equitable aid in enforcing defendant's contract to sell and
deliver all his lead-silver ores, concentrates, or slimes to the plaintiff,
the Federal District Court of Oregon2" said:
"It can no longer be maintained that a suit will not lie for spe-
cific preformance of a contract respecting personalty. The under-
lying thought touching such a suit is whether the suitor has a
plain, speedy, adequate and complete remedy at law. If he has, he
cannot have specific performance." 21
This result does not rest on the uniqueness of the chattel, but enables
the court to recognize plaintiff's business needs. However, many courts
still adhere to the proposition that specific performance will not be
granted unless the commodity concerned has some peculiar, unique, or
special character which cannot be measured in damages.
22
' Adams v. Messenger, 147 Mass. 185, 189, 17 N. E. 491, 495 (1888).
18 Thompson v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 197 Va. 208, 89 S. E. 2d 64 (1955).
"Adams v. Messenger, 147 Mass. 185, 17 N. E. 491 (1888); Thompson v.
Commonwealth of Virginia, 197 Va. 208, 89 S. E. 2d 64 (1955).
_oAmerican Smelting & Refining Co. v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Con-
centrating Co., 248 Fed. 172 (Ore. 1918).
21Id. at 182.
-- Southern Iron & Equipment Co. v. Vaughan, 201 Ala. 356, 78 So. 212 (1918)
(iron rails); Fraser v. Cohen, 159 Fla. 253, 31 So. 2d 463 (1947) (bananas);
Steinway & Sons v. Massey, 198 Ky. 265, 248 S. W. 884 (1923) (piano) ; Chabert
v. Robert & Co., Inc., 273 App. Div. 237, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 400 (1948) (containers
for oil); Titus v. Empire Mink Corp., 17 N. Y. S. 2d (1939) (mink).
19561
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Denial of relief because the product is not unique but is obtainable
in the open market does not consider the delay or risk which may be
incurred in obtaining such goods. It, in effect, forces the plaintiff to sell
his contract rights for money damages, while enabling the defendant
wrongdoer, at his option, to perform or pay money damages.23 These
factors are important and the policy requiring consideration of them
seems sounder.
Stocks and Bonds
The settled rule in this country and in England seems to be that
contracts for public securities such as government stocks and bonds, will
not be specifically enforced, because they can usually be obtained in the
market.24 But in England, contracts for the sale of railway and other
business corporation shares will be specifically enforced,25 while in this
country, the weight of authority denies such relief unless it is shown
that similar shares are not available in the open market.26 The reason
for this difference probably results from the difficulty experienced in the
transferring of stocks and bonds in England as contrasted with the rela-
tive ease of such transfer in this country.
27
However, even in this country specific performance is granted where
there is a showing that the stock is of a peculiar or special value to the
plaintiff; that it is not of easily ascertainable value; that it is unavailable
in the market ;2s or that the stock is needed to enable the purchaser to
obtain control of the corporation.
29
23 2 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 994 (14th ed. 1918).
' 4 POMEROY, EQuiTY JURISPRUDENCE § 1402 (5th ed. 1941).
2 Shaw v. Fisher, 2 De G. & S. 11, 64 Eng. Reprint 5 (1848). See generally
22 A. L. R. 1037, supplemented by 130 A. L. R. 923.
" General Securities Corp. v. Welton, 223 Ala. 299, 135 So. 329 (1931) ; Gil-
fallan v. Gilfallan, 168 Cal. 23, 141 Pac. 623 (1914) ; Rimes v. Rimes, 152 Ga. 721,
111 S. E. 34 (1922); Fitzgibbons v. White, 296 Mass. 468, 6 N. E. 429 (1937);
Richardson v. Lamb, 253 Mich. 659, 235 N. W. 817 (1931) ; Last Chance Ranch
Co. v. Erickson, 82 Utah 475, 25 P. 2d 952 (1933).
-" This difficulty in transferring stocks in England is because the English com-
panies are usually joint-stock associations whose powers are derived from and
regulated by articles of association or deeds of settlement. These articles and
deeds often restrict or make the methods of transfer cumbersome. POMEROY, SPE-
CIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS § 18 (3rd ed. 1926).
" Gilfallan v. Gilfallan, 168 Cal. 23, 141 Pac. 623 (1914) ; Baruch v. W. B.
Haggerty, Inc., 137 Fla. 499, 188 So. 797 (1939) ; Rimes v. Rimes, 152 Ga. 721,
111 S. E. 34 (1922) ; Smurr v. Komer, 301 Ill. 179, 133 N. E. 715 (1921) ; Tala-
mini v. Rosa, 257 Ky. 228, 77 S. W. 2d 627 (1934) ; Goodhue v. State Street Trust
Co., 267 Mass. 28, 165 N. E. 701 (1929) ; Richardson v. Lamb, 253 Mich. 659, 235
N. W. 817 (1931) ; Model Clothing House v. Dickinson, 146 Minn. 367, 178 N. W.
957 (1920) ; In re Rosenthal's Estate, 335 Pa. 49, 6 A.2d 858 (1939) ; Florence
Printing Co. v. Parnell, 178 S. C. 119, 182 S. E. 313 (1935).
"' Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Rice, 186 Fed. 204 (N. D. Ala. 1910) ; Sherwood
v. Wallin, 1 Cal. App. 532, 82 Pac. 566 (1905) ; Johnson v. Johnson, 87 Colo. 207,
286 Pac. 109 (1930) ; Francis v. Medill, 16 Del. Ch. 129, 141 Atl. 697 (1928);
Schmidt v. Pritchard, 135 Iowa 240, 112 N. W. 801 (1907) ; Nason v. Barrett,
140 Minn. 366, 168 N. W. 581 (1918); Hirschman v. Casey, 121 Neb. 471, 237
N. W. 584 (1931) ; In re Rosenthal's Estate, 335 Pa. 49, 6 A. 2d 585 (1939);
Bumgardner v. Leavitt, 35 W. Va. 194, 13 S. E. 67 (1891).
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Thus, it appears that equity courts in this country have almost uni-
versally adopted the "unique theory" in determining the inadequacy of
the remedy at law with respect to stocks and bonds. However, this seems
to result in no injustice between the parties in most cases. Whether the
courts would liberalize this view and hold the legal remedy inadequate
where changes in business conditions affect the availability and price of
the stock at the time of the action at law, or whether they have adopted
an inflexible rule in this area is not clear. The latter seems more prob-
able. But at least one case supports the first view. In a fairly late
California case,30 the court quoted with approval the following statement:
"Indeed, it has been thought, that on contracts for stock a bill
ought now to be maintainable generally in equity for a specific de-
livery thereof, upon the ground that a Court of Law cannot give
the property, but can only give a remedy in damages, the beneficial
effect of which depends upon the personal responsibility of the
party.'
Patents and Patent Rights
The availability of specific performance in this area is based on the
theory that the patent is of some peculiar and special value to the plain-
tiff and cannot be readily obtained in the market.3 2 As this class of chat-
tels is unique itself in that the vendor has a legal monopoly, the adoption
of a more liberal policy is not necessary for specific performance to be
obtained even in the most conservative courts. Even so, one court has
expressly based relief upon such a liberal policy.33
Licenses
This class of chattel can also be said to be unique in itself, as it is not
ordinarily obtainable in the market, but through the actions of third
persons, over whom the court has no control.3 4 The Indiana court in
Marion Trucking Co. v. Harwood Trucking, Inc.3 5 said:
"There is no question but that the right to operate a particular
part of an interstate transportation system is a unique property
" Karabek v. Weaver Aircraft Corp., 65 Cal. App. 2d 32, 149 P. 2d 876 (1944).
311Id. at 39, 149 P. 2d at 880. The statement quoted is that of Justice Story in
2 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 994 (14th ed. 1918).
" E. F. Drew & Co., Inc. v. Reinhard, 170 F. 2d 679 (2d Cir. 1948) ; Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. of Akron, Ohio v. Miller, 22 F. 2d 353 (9th Cir. 1927) ; Missis-
sippi Glass Co. v. Franzer, 143 Fed. 501 (3d Cir. 1906) ; McFarland v. Stanton
Mfg. Co., 53 N. J. Eq. 649, 33 At. 962 (1896) ; Whitcomb v. Whitcomb, 85 Vt.
76, 81 Atl. 97 (1911) ; Fuller & Johnson Mfg. Co. v. Bartlett, 68 Wis. 73, 31 N. W.
747 (1887). See also, 2 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 996 (14th ed. 1918).
" No-Leak-O Piston Ring Co. v. Chandlee, 289 Fed. 526 (D. C. Cir. 1923).
"Watson Bros. Transp. Co. v. Jaffa, 143 F. 2d 340 (8th Cir. 1944) ; McLean
v. Keith, 236 N. C. 59, 72 S. E. 2d 44 (1952) ; Lennon v. Habit, 216 N. C. 141,
4 S. E. 2d 339 (1939). See also, L. R. A. 1918E 597, 619-621.
"r- Ind. App. -, 116 N. E. 2d 636 (1954).
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interest which cannot be obtained or transferred without Inter-
state Commerce Commission approval. Also, by way of compari-
son, it is obvious and axiomatic that the right to transport com-
modities for hire over any particular land route is as unique in
character as the unique value which attaches to any particular
piece of real estate and cannot be duplicated."3
New Jersey37 disagrees with the granting of specific performance of
contracts relating to licenses. This is due partially to its view that spe-
cific performance is an extraordinary remedy of equity and partially to
the idea in that state that a license is in no sense property. 88
Although most courts would provide equitable relief in this area,
the existence of more sympathetic courts is evidenced by the fact that
specific performance has been granted even where it becomes necessary
for the court to supervise a business. A federal court in New York 0
specifically enforced a contract which provided for delivery to plaintiff
of certain licenses and leases which were preparatory to the installation
of certain machines. The court said:
"[P]rotracted supervision of a business should not be as-
sumed, but it is not true that it cannot be assumed. Everything
depends on how insistently the justice of the case demands the
court's assumption of difficult, unfamiliar, and contentious busi-
ness problems. The tendency of the times is to take on harder and
longer jobs."40
Businesses
Ordinarily specific performance will be granted for the sale of a busi-
ness4 ' unless the contract involved is for the sale of the "good-will" only,
in which case, equity will not award relief.42 The reason for the normal
result is that ordinarily a similar business and location is unavailable in
the market, and therefore, the plaintiff cannot be compensated in dam-
ages.43 It has been held, however, that the mere fact that the contract
involves a business does not, as a matter of right, permit the decree.44
"0Id. at -, 116 N. E. 2d at 641.
"' Rawlins v. Trevethan, 139 N. J. Eq. 226, 50 A. 2d 852 (1947) ; Mannion v.
Greenbrook Hotel, Inc., 138 N. J. Eq. 518, 48 A. 2d 888 (1946) ; Navack v. Krauz,
138 N. J. Eq. 241, 47 A. 2d 586 (1946) ; Lachow v. Alper, 130 N. J. Eq. 588, 23
A. 2d 595 (1942) ; Walsh v. Bradley, 121 N. J. Eq. 359, 190 Atl. 88 (1937).
"s Voight v. Board of Excise Comm'rs of City of Newark, 59 N. J. L. 358, 36
Atl. 686 (1896).
" Kerns-Gorsuch Co. v. Hartford-Fairmont Co., 1 F. 2d 318 (S. D. N. Y. 1921).
'Old. at 319-320.
"49 Am. JUR., Specific Performance § 128 (1943).
'2 Zeigler v. Sentzer, 8 Gill & Johnson (Md.) 150, 29 Am. Dec. 534 (1836).
Chamber of Commerce v. Barton, 195 Ark. 274, 112 S. W. 2d 619 (1937);
Carolee v. Handelis, 103 Ga. 299, 29 S. E. 935 (1898) ; Brady v. Yost, 6 Idaho 273,
55 Pac. 542 (1898); Butler v. Wright, 186 N. Y. 259, 78 N. E. 1002 (1906);
Cochrane v. Szpakowski, 355 Pa. 357, 49 A. 2d 692 (1946).
"Campbell v. Stetes, 300 Ky. 745, 190 S. W. 2d 347 (1945).
[Vol. 34
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For instance, one court seems to require, before specific performance
can be granted, that the contract must relate to that species of property
which has a sentimental, peculiar, or unique value, such as heirlooms,
portraits, furniture or antiques. 4 5 But opposed to this extreme position
is that adopted by a court in New York46 that the jurisdiction of equity
to grant specific performance is no longer to be doubted in cases where
compensation in damages will not furnish a complete and satisfactory
remedy.
Building and Construction Contracts
Generally, it has been thought that specific performance of these
contracts could not be decreed, because the decree would call for super-
vision by the court extending over a long period of time, or calling for a
knowledge of technical matters which neither the court nor its officers
could be expected to possess. 47 Also, it has been said that the remedy
at law is ordinarily adequate compensation for the refusal to perform,
because the plaintiff can have the work done by another and recover the
increased costs as damages from the defendant.
48
The English courts have established four exceptions to this rule, and
in these cases specific performance will be granted; (1) where the agree-
ment to build is defined and certain; (2) where the defendant has con-
tracted to build on his own land and the plaintiff has a material interest
therein; (3) where the defendant has agreed to build on land acquired
by conveyance from the plaintiff; and (4) where there has been a part
performance, and the defendant is enjoying the benefits.
49
These exceptions have been recognized by some of the American
courts, where, by reason of such circumstances, the remedy at law would
be deemed to be inadequate. 50 Where public interest and convenience are
at stake, courts of equity will go much further in either granting or deny-
ing specific performance, if such is in furtherance of the public interest,
than they ordinarily would in cases of purely private interests.5 '
Id. at 748, 190 S. W. 2d at 349.
46Johnson v. Brooks, 93 N. Y. 337 (1883), followed in Reo Stores v. Kent
Stores, 118 N. Y. S. 2d (1952).
4" Texas & P. R. Co. v. Marshall, 136 U. S. 393 (1889) ; Leonard v. Board of
Directors of Plum Bayou Levee Dist., 79 Ark. 42, 94 S. W. 922 (1906) ; Stanton
v. Singleton, 126 Cal. 657, 59 Pac. 146 (1899) ; Bomer v. Canaday, 79 Miss. 222,
30 So. 638 (1901) ; Ward v. Newbold, 115 Md. 689, 81 Atl. 793 (1911) ; Edison
Illuminating Co. v. Eastern Pennsylvania Power Co., 253 Pa. 457, 98 Atl. 652
(1916). See also, 9 Am. JuR., Building and Constructiont Contracts § 124 (1943).
48 London Bucket Co., Inc. v. Stewart, 314 Ky. 832, 237 S. W. 2d 509 (1951).
"4 Pox!mEoy, EQuiTY JURISPRUDENCE § 1402 (5th ed. 1941).
ro Herzog v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 153 Cal. 496, 95 Pac. 898 (1908);
Taylor v. Florida East Coast R. R., 54 Fla. 635, 45 So. 574 (1907); Jones v.
Parker, 163 Mass. 564, 40 N. E. 1044 (1895) ; Beck v. Allison, 56 N. Y. 366, 15
Am. Rep. 430 (1874) ; McCarter v. Armstrong, 32 S. C. 203, 10 S. E. 953 (1890).
" Virginia Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, Railway Employees Department
of the American Federation of Labor, 300 U. S. 515 (1932) ; Wheeling Traction
Co. v. Board of Comm'rs of Belmont County, Ohio, 248 Fed. 205 (6th Cir. 1918) ;
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The idea that the courts should not undertake supervision of con-
struction work has been dispelled somewhat by the decision in Board of
Commissioners of Mattamuiskeet Drainage District v. A. V. Wills &
Sons,52 where the court adopted the following statement made by Chief
Justice Fuller in Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island &
Pacific Railway Co.:
5 3
"But it is objected that equity will not decree specific perform-
ance of a contract requiring continuous acts, involving skill,
judgment, and technical knowledge.... We do not think so....
It must not be forgotten that, in the increasing complexities of
modem business relations, equitable remedies have necessarily
and steadily been expanded, and no inflexible rule has been per-
mitted to circumscribe them." 54
In this area a change in policy by the courts to respond to demands
for equitable relief is apparent. First, exceptions were made to a hard
and fast rule by which the courts refused to undertake supervisory
duties. Then, doubt was cast on the force of the rule itself by courts
who, realizing a need for expanding equitable remedies, undertook super-
vision of complicated transactions.
Uniform Sales Act
This act, which has been patterned after the English Sale of Goods
Act,55 has been adopted in about three-fourths of the jurisdictions in this
country.56 Section 68 of the Act reads as follows:
"Where the seller has broken a contract to deliver specific or
ascertained goods, a court having the powers of a court of Equity
may, if it thinks fit, on the application of the buyer, by its judg-
ment or decree, direct that the contract shall be performed speci-
fically, without giving the seller the option of retaining the goods
on payment of damages. The judgment or decree may be uncon-
ditional, or upon such terms and conditions as to damages, pay-
ment of the price, and otherwise, as to the court may seem just."
The author of this section, Professor Williston, stated in his treatise
on Sales:
"Courts of Equity have very closely restricted their jurisdic-
tion in regard to contracts for the sale of personal property. It
would sometimes promote justice if the courts were somewhat
Edison Illuminating Co. v. Eastern Pennsylvania Power Co., 253 Pa. 457, 98 Atl.
652 (1916).f2236 Fed. 362 (E. D. N. C. 1916). 163 U. S. 564, 600 (1896)'.
Board of Comm'rs of Mattamuskeet Drainage District v. A. V. Wills & Sons,
236 Fed. 362, 380 (E. D. N. C. 1916).
"56 & 57 Vicr. 52 c. 71 (1893). 0Note, 27 GEo. L. J. 793 (1939).
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more ready to allow specific performance of contracts to sell goods
in cases where for any reason damages did not seem adequate.
This section of the act will perhaps dispose courts to enlarge
somewhat the number of cases where specific performance is
allowed."67
It appears that very few courts that have considered the Act have
shared the views of Professor Williston. The courts have treated the
section in three different ways :58 (1) by granting specific performance
in reliance upon the Act, even though it would have been granted without
the aid of the Act;59 (2) by granting specific performance under the Act,
where it would not have been granted had it not been for the Act;6O
(3) by treating the Act as having made no change in the existing law.61
Even though there are three different interpretations of the effect of the
Act, it is no longer an important factor, as few courts have even men-
tioned it when faced with the question of specific performance of con-
tracts in reference to personal property.0 2 This Act, if liberally inter-
preted, should have been construed as it was written, that being, to en-
large the scope of specific performance.
Conclusion
The adequacy test, for the most part, remains a stumbling block to
specific performance of chattel contracts. However, some courts have
developed a more flexible approach 63 which emphasizes the needs of the
parties rather than strictly adhering to the historical approach with its
few exceptions. Much of the necessity for such a test has been lost
through the fusion of law and equity under the codes, and today, the
needs of modem business relations call for a more flexible rule.
SPENCER L. BLAYLOCK, JR.
"3 WILLISToN, SALES § 601 (2d ed. 1924).
It is to be noted that Michigan appears in all three categories.
" Eastern Rolling Mill Co. v. Michlovitz, 157 Md. 51, 145 Atl. 378 (1929)
Krause v. Hoffman, 239 Mich. 348, 214 N. W. 146 (1927) ; Diamond Lumber Co.
v. Anderson, 216 Mich. 71, 184 N. W. 557 (1921).
"0 Michigan Sugar Co. v. Falkenhagen, 243 Mich. 698, 220 N. W. 760 (1928);
Hughbanks v. Browning, 9 Ohio App. 114 (1917); Pittenger Equipment Co. v.
Timber Structures, Inc., 189 Ore. 1, 217 P. 2d 770 (1950).
"2 G. C. Outten Grain Co. v. Grace, 239 Ill. App. 284 (1925) ; Tales v. Duplex
Power Co., 202 Mich. 224, 168 N. W. 495 (1918).
" Masterson, Specific Performance of Contracts to Deliver Specific and Ascer-
tained Goods Under the English Sale of Goods Act and the American Sales Act,
LEGAL ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO ORRIN Kip McMIURRAY, 793 (1939).
"Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 163 U. S.
564 (1896); No-Leak-O Piston Ring Co. v. Chandlee, 289 Fed. 526 (D. C. Cir.
1923) ; American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining &
Concentrating Co., 248 Fed. 172 (Ore. 1918) ; Karabek v. Weaver Aircraft Corp.,
64 Cal. App. 2d 32, 149 P. 2d 876 (1944) ; Adams v. Messenger, 147 Mass. 185,
17 N. E. 491 (1888) ; Thompson v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 197 Va. 208, 89
S. E. 2d 64 (1955).
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